

Smartcard protocols ISO 7816

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Standard for contact smartcards ISO 7816

- 7816-1 Physical characteristics
- 7816-2 Dimension & size of contacts
- 7816-3 Electronic signals and transmission protocols
 - defines voltage & current requirements
- 7816-4 Inter-industry commands
 - standard set of commands
- 7816-5 Numbering system for application identifiers (AIDs)
- 7816-6 ...
- 7816-...
- 7816-...
- 7816-15

For **contactless** (aka proximity) cards: **ISO 14443**

Additional application-level specs for **bank cards (EMV)**,
SIM cards, e-passports, e-driving licenses, ...

Contact cards (ISO 7816-2)



- **Vcc** originally 5 V, now also 3V or 1.8V
 - Vpp, higher voltage for writing to EEPROM, no longer used as it introduces security weakness
- **Clock** originally 3.57 MHz or 4.92MHz
- **I/O** speeds in order of > 100 Kbit/s
 - C4 & C8 can be used for USB2.0 up to 12 Mbit/s
- C6 can be used for **Single Wire Protocol (SWP)** to connect SIM card to the phone's NFC antenna

Communication with terminals

Master-Slave communication:

- terminal (aka CAD, card acceptance device) is master
- smartcard is slave

Hence: *terminal takes the initiative,*
smartcard cannot initiate actions

For SIM cards a polling mechanism was used to overcome this limitation:
the handset regularly polls the SIM card to ask if it wants to do something

The Terminal Problem!

No I/O between user and card

- no display
- no keyboard

Why is this a problem?

Some experimental cards with displays, keyboards, or fingerprint readers.

Trusted I/O to the card holder



I/O via devices such as



means these have to *trusted*

Card Activation (ISO 7816-3)

1. terminal activates card

- earth; voltage; clock; reset

2. card responds with ATR (Answer To Reset)

- max 33 bytes, usually a lot less (for speed)
- must be sent between 400 & 40,000 clock cycles
 - obligatory info about the protocol used
 - T=0 byte-oriented
 - T=1 block-oriented
 - supported baud rate for I/O
 - usually some manufacturer info
 - id of OS and version no. of ROM mask
 - obligatory last byte XOR checksum

APDU communication (ISO 7816-4)

All subsequent communication via **APDUs**

Application Protocol Data Units

which are just sequences of bytes in particular format


1. Terminal sends **command APDU**
 2. Card replies with **response APDU**
- etc, etc

Command APDU



- **CLA** class byte
 - **INS** instruction byte
 - **P1,P2** parameters
- } **obligatory**
- **Lc** length of data block
 - **Data** Lc bytes of data
 - **Le** length of expected response
- } **optional**

Response APDU



- **Data** : Le bytes of data (**optional**)
- **SW1, SW2** : status word (**obligatory**)

APDU coding conventions

- Conventions for some CLA& INS bytes are given in ISO 7816-4
- Conventions for status word SW1 SW2
 - normal processing 61xx, 9000
 - warning processing 62xx, 63xx
 - execution error 64xx, 65xx
 - coding error 67xx, 6Fxx

ISO 7816 standard commands

- ISO 7816-4 also standardises some **functionality & associated commands**, for
 - a file system
 - PIN codes
 - (building blocks for) authentication protocols
- You do not have to stick to using & implementing these commands, but they may provide inspiration.
 - The aim was to standardise basic functionality, so that applications can be created by configuring standard functionality rather than 'real' programming
- Other standards for more specific functionality:
 - EMV for banking cards
 - GSM 11.11 and its superset EN 726-3 for SIM cards
 - United Nations ICAO specs for e-passport
 - ISO 18013 for e-driving license

PIN verification command in ISO 7816

- **VERIFY** command for PIN code verification
 - aka CHV = Card Holder Verification = PIN

ISO 7816-4 defines that instruction (INS) byte for **VERIFY** is 20, and class (CLA) byte is 00

Example Authentication Protocols

ISO 7816-4 defines some standard instructions for authentication using challenge-response

- For authentication of *card* by terminal
 - INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
 - arguments: random, algorithm , key no
 - card returns: $\text{enc}(\text{key}, \text{random})$
- For authentication of *terminal* by the card
 - GET CHALLENGE
 - card returns random number
 - EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
 - arguments: $\text{enc}(\text{key}, \text{random})$, algorithm, key no

Example Authentication Protocols

For *mutual* authentication

- GET CHIP NUMBER
 - card returns `chip number`
- GET CHALLENGE
 - card returns `smart card random, s_rnd`
- MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE
 - arguments: `key, terminal random, s_rnd, chip number, algorithm,`
 - card returns: `enc(key, terminal random || s_rnd)`

Future

ISO7816 protocol stems from 1980s and it shows!

Slow speed & small size of APDUs can be a bottleneck.

- **Faster communication speeds wanted?**
 - eg. USB 2.0
- **More modern protocols wanted?**
 - There has been an experimental JavaCard 3.0 version with https support