

Vulnerability of elections

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Vulnerability of elections

Much emphasis on correctness of the outcome

- ▶ Voting computers (of Nedap en Sdu) have disappeared, because:
 - individual votes leaked via **tempest** emissions
 - software was unprotected — and could thus be manipulated
- ▶ Also the **counting** and **merging** of outcomes was vulnerable
- ▶ Electoral Board (Kiesraad) Interior Ministry have invested in the **correctness** and **reliability** of the election results
 - colleague in computer security Herbert Bos in Electoral Board
 - professionalisation of ICT-department of Electoral Board
 - with **open source** policy, for transparency and autonomy



Own involvement in “voting”

- ▶ Voting is fascinating topic, from a security perspective
 - authentication, secrecy, integrity, availability
 - with many creative (cryptographic) solutions
- ▶ Member of **Korthals Altes** committee, in 2007
 - report **Stemmen met Vertrouwen** still authoritative
 - formal basis for abolishing voting computers in NL
- ▶ Topic of own research and public discussion
 - even before Gonggrijp’s **wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl**
 - PC member at conference **E-Vote-ID**, since several years
 - new NWO research project about “local” voting



Frequently used quote in this setting

Those who vote decide nothing

Those who count the vote decide everything

Attributed to **Joseph Stalin**



Current variation

*Don't bother manipulating the vote outcome
when you can easily manipulate the voters*

Attributed to:



Disruption through “social” media

- ▶ Big “social” media are platforms for commercial and political manipulation
 - under control of **tech-bro's of Trump** — and also of Xi
 - with anti-democratic, and anti-European agenda
 - effective targeting and manipulation based on **personal** profiles
- ▶ Attention economy leads to **radicalisation** and **polarisation**
 - Jaron Lanier: X/Twitter is a “asshole amplification network”
- ▶ Toxic environment for (wel-willing) public office holders, politicians, experts, esp. for women and minorities
 - undermining content-driven democratic debate
- ▶ Based on extreme interpretation of freedom of speech
 - not on human **dignity** and quality of debate
- ▶ In everybody's pocket, basis for “news” and personal judgements



Presidential elections Romania (late 2024, early 2025)

- ▶ Out of the blue winner, in first round of Nov'24: **Călin Georgescu**
 - extreme-right, pro-Russian, critical of EU and NATO
 - campagne mainly via TikTok
- ▶ Romanian security council, based on intelligence-reports: Russia manipulated the presidential elections
 - 'state actor' massively promoted Georgescu clips on TikTok
 - via coordinated accounts & recommendation algorithms
 - people voted on carefully constructed online illusion, fact-free
- ▶ Journalist Razvan Lutac (Snoop): “Not only Romania is in danger. This may happen as well in Germany or The Netherlands”
- ▶ Romanian supreme court then excludes Georgescu
 - Does NL have such a **emergency button** / **brake**? Who does?
- ▶ In the end, narrow victory for pro-European candidate Nicusor Dan



And there is also AI

- ▶ This summer BNR asked AI-chatbots **vote recommendations**
 - ChatGPT, Copilot, Gemini, Grok; only Copilot politely refused
- ▶ This is what people will do in large numbers
 - Tech-bro's only need to build in a slight bias
 - democrates and anti-democrates are close, in many places
- ▶ Manipulation and misleading are so much easier with AI-bots
 - via text, but also via (deepfake) video, making deeper impression
 - populists instrumentalise AI (more) effectively / shamelessly



Painful questions

How did we let these controversial actors take total control over our information and decision space — making it such a hostile environment for running democratic elections?

- ▶ Maybe more important: *how do we get out of here?*
- ▶ I offer no solutions, at most some, **separate directions**:
 - (1) invest in own decent alternatives — and use them too
 - (2) **regulate** even more strictly, and even **forbid** certain “social” media
 - (3) hardening of our ICT-infrastructure
 - (4) digital resillience w.r.t. elections
 - (5) stop being naive, for a resilient democracy
 - (6) ...



Ad (2): stricter regulation

- ▶ EU has legal framework, but fines are slow and “after the fact”
 - EU is regulatory power, in need of “own” technology
- ▶ Tech-bro’s are not impressed and organise political counter pressure
- ▶ Hard violations should lead to **hard bans**
 - violations like giving space to political manipulation (Romania)
 - reluctance to moderate, even against threats and violence
- ▶ Quicker applicable: **soft bans**
 - TikTok, X, etc. no longer on work phone
 - banning access to juveniles
 - give the right example, quit yourself
- ▶ Clear normative positioning: **this does not fit our democracy, based on mutual respect and dignity**
 - do not go along with absolute interpretation of “freedom of speech”



Ad (1): invest in and make alternatives standard

- ▶ Different NL initiatives, based on public values:
 - **Civic Social Media**
 - **#MakeSocialsSocialAgain**
- ▶ Own community network **PubHubs.net**
 - aim is a combination of **privacy** and **accountability**
 - via flexible digital identities (later also with EU ID wallet)
 - including digital signatures
 - for decent contact with/among audience of organisations
 - now working on pilots, broader launch later this year
- ▶ Also relevant for discussions about **youth** and “sociale” media
 - when there are proper alternatives, (age) bans for the controversial platforms are less drastic



Ad (3): hardening ICT-infrastructure

- ▶ Our informatiespace is flooded with mis/dis-information, increasingly AI-generated
- ▶ Deliberate strategy: *flooding the zone with bullshit* (Steve Bannon)
 - the aim is **reality fatigue** among the population
 - so that people give up trying to find out what is true or not
 - in the US, now in the form of total **self-destruction**
- ▶ Own proposal: focus on **authenticity** of information
 - i.e. certainty about source and integrity
 - this is not the same as truth
 - great mechanism: **digital signature**
 - see article **The Authenticity Crisis** (Comp. Law Security Rev, 2024)



Ad (4): increase digital resilience

- ▶ Task of security/intelligence services is to protect our **democratic order**
 - that is at stake, against state actors & big corporations (like X)
 - an assertive approach is needed (take-downs, hacking etc)
 - **expose**, so that the public sees what is happening, like in Romania
- ▶ In NL **Electoral Board** is silent and lacks an explicit **mandate** w.r.t. voter manipulation. This should come on the (political) agenda



Final remarks I

You might say:

- ▶ where is the proof that manipulation by these tech-bros happens, and that it actually influences the election results?

My reply:

- ▶ you do not demand from a slave to give proof of being maltreated and that the treatment actually has negative influence
- ▶ you resist the very constellation/institution of slavery

Aside: this is the **republican** perspective (as opposed to the **liberal** view), that emphasises absence of (the possibility of) **arbitrary interference**, as hallmark of freedom



Ad (5): resilient democracy, without naivety

- ▶ **Example**: changing NL constitution for **binding referendum**
 - in final phase, only one last round through Senate is needed
- ▶ Emerged from well-intended “power to the people” thought (SP)
- ▶ The last 10 years have shown
 - referendums are hijacked by anti-democrats
 - ideal instrument for polarisation & distortion, for own agenda
- ▶ What do we do in NL? We make the referendum **binding**
 - we are preparing the instruments for disruption
 - Putin and Trump are gearing up (“spugen zich in de handen”)
 - see NL op-ed: [iBestuur](#) (5/12/2024)
- ▶ Aside: **preferendum** is more constructive and nuanced alternative
 - with a spectrum of options, that invites deliberation



Final remarks II

- ▶ Much attention for reliability of election results, but not (yet) for (external) manipulation of voters
- ▶ Supreme Court lawyer Ybo Buruma (NRC, 6/6/2025): “A democracy can kill itself” (“Een democratie kan zichzelf de nek om draaien”)
- ▶ The anti-democratic strategy is familiar by now:
 - frame / make the current situation abnormal, dangerous, bad
 - manipulate voters via “social” media (esp. via disinformation)
 - govern via emergency laws and decrees
- ▶ Urgency and priority needed in politics & institutions, with mandates
 - NL **emergency button** / **brake** needed at Electoral Board, or at Supreme Court, or at ... ?
 - Authorities / supervisors (GDPR, DSA) can be more assertive
- ▶ Invest in sovereignty, own control, own hardened infrastructure
 - “taking back control”
- ▶ Naivety has a very high price!

