

# Smashing the stack

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## continued

# Last week

- Using **buffer overruns** or **format string attacks** to corrupt the stack esp. the control data on the stack:  
    **frame pointers** and **return addresses**
- A classic buffer overflow to
  1. first inserting malicious shell code into some buffer on the stack
  2. then overwriting return address on the stack to jump to that code

Today:

- some variations when messing with frame pointers and return addresses
- some defenses

*warning: potential exam  
questions coming up*

## example vulnerable code

```
m() {  
    int x = 4;  
    f(); // return_to_m  
    printf ("x is %i", x);}
```

```
f() {  
    int y = 7;  
    g(); // return_to_f  
    printf ("y+10 is %i", y+10);}
```

```
g() {  
    char buf[80];  
    gets(buf);  
    printf(buf);  
    gets(buf);}
```

# example vulnerable code

```
m() {  
    int x = 4;  
    f(); // return_to_m  
    printf ("x is %i", x);}
```

```
f() {  
    int y = 7;  
    g(); // return_to_f  
    printf ("y+10 is %i", y+10); }
```

```
g() {  
    char buf[80];  
    gets(buf);  
    printf(buf);  
    gets(buf);  
}
```

An attacker could

1. first inspect the stack using a malicious format string (entered in first `gets` and printed with `printf`)
2. then overflow `buf` to corrupt the stack (with the second `gets`)

potential overflow of `buf`


potential format string attack

# example vulnerable code

```
m() {  
  int x = 4;  
  f(); // return_to_m  
  printf ("x is %i", x);  
}
```

```
f() {  
  int y = 7;  
  g(); // return_to_f  
  printf ("y+10 is %i", y+10);  
}
```

```
g() {  
  char buf[80];  
  gets(buf);  
  printf(buf);  
  gets(buf);  
}
```



# Normal execution

- After completing `g`  
execution continues with `f` from program point `return_to_f`

This will print 17.

- After completing `f`  
execution continues with `main` from program point `return_to_m`

This will print 4.

If we start [smashing the stack](#) different things can happen

# Attack scenario 1

in `g()` we overflow `buf` to overwrite values of `x` or `y`.

- After completing `g`  
execution continues with `f` from program point `return_to_f`

This will print whatever value we gave to `y` +10.

- After completing `f`  
execution continues with `m` from program point `return_to_m`

This will print whatever value we gave to `x`.

Of course, it is easier to overwrite local variables in the current frame than variables in 'lower' frames



## Attack scenario 2

In `g()` we overflow `buf` to overwrite return address `return_to_f` with `return_to_m`

- After completing `g` execution continues with `m` instead of `f` but with `f`'s stack frame.

This will print 7.

- After completing `m` execution continues with `m`.

This will print 4.

## Attack scenario 3

In `g()` we overflow `buf` to overwrite frame pointer `fp_f` with `fp_m`

- After completing `g`  
execution continues with `f`  
but with `m`'s stack frame

This will print 14.

- After completing `f`  
execution continues with whatever code called `m`.

So we never finish the function call `m`, the remaining part of the code (after the call to `f`) will never be executed.

## Attack scenario 4

In `g()` we overflow `buf` to overwrite frame pointer `fp_f` with `fp_g`

- After completing `g` execution continues with `f` but with `g`'s stack frame.

This will print (some bytes of `buf +10`).

- After completing `f`, execution might continue with `f`, again with `g`'s stack frame, repeating this for ever.

This depends on whether the compiled code looks up values from the top of `g`'s stack frame, or the bottom of `g`'s stack frame. In the latter case the code will jump to some code depending on the contents of `buf`.

## Attack scenario 5

In `g()` we overflow `buf` to overwrite frame pointer `fp_f` with some pointer into `buf`

- After completing `g` execution continues with `f` but with part of `buf` as stack frame.

This will print (some part of `buf`) +10.

- After completing `f` not clear what will happen...

## Attack scenario 6

In `g()` we overflow `buf` to overwrite the return address `return_to_f` to point in [some code somewhere](#), and the frame pointer to point inside `buf`.

- After completing `g` execution continues executing that code using part of `buf` as stack frame.

This can do all sorts of things!

If we have enough code to choose from, this can do anything we want.

Often a return address in some library routine in `libc` is used, in what is then called a [return-to-libc attack](#).

# Attack scenario 7

In `g()` we overflow `buf` to overwrite the return address to point inside `buf`

- After completing `g` execution continues with whatever code (aka shell code) was written in `buf`, using `f`'s stack frame.  
This can do anything we want.

This is the [classic buffer overflow attack](#) discussed last week

- You could also overwrite `sp_f` and supply the attack code with a fake stack frame, but typically the shell code won't need a stack frame
- This attack requires that the computer (OS+ hardware) can be tricked into executing data allocated on the stack. Many systems will no longer execute data (code) on the stack or on the heap.

# Memory segments revisited

Normally (always?) the **program counter** should point somewhere in the **code segment**

The attack scenarios discussed in these slides only involved overflowing buffers on the **stack**.

Buffers allocated on the **heap** or as **global variables** can also be overflowed to change program behaviour, but to mess with return addresses or frame pointers we need to overflow on the stack

