



## **Software and Web Security 2**

# **MitM attacks on sessions**

# MitM (Man-in-the-Middle)attacks

- MitM attack: attacker gets between the browser and the web server, eg
  - by setting up a wifi access point
  - by luring victim to his website and passing on traffic to another site
- https (ie TLS/SSL) should protect against this...
- Recorded presentation by Moxie Marlinspike highlights the problem that *https* connection is often set up by an *http* request
  - first step is then unprotected...

# Two variants of SSL stripping



# SSL stripping (1): https+https


Different ways for attacker to set up the first https tunnel to himself

1. Use a self-signed certificate for bank.com
  - but warnings will scare most users away ☹️
2. Buggy https implementations in browser may be tricked by attacker using his genuine leaf certificate for mafia.com to sign a certificate for bank.com
3. Attacker can buy domain name that looks like bank.com with international characters
  - but browser using puny-code will reveal this to user ☹️
4. Attacker can redirect to mafia.com
  - a) and hope the user does not notice the mafia.com in address bar
  - b) better, use characters that look like / and ? to make URL that looks like the bank's (eg `http://bank.com/Somelongname?.mafia.com`)
    - but browser highlighting domain part of URL may warn user ☹️

(The recorded Blackhat presentation discusses 2 and 4b)

## SSL stripping (2) http+https

- A MitM attacker can simply not bother with setting up an https tunnel to the client, and simply use http for the first leg, hoping the user won't notice the missing **s**



(The recorded Blackhat presentation discusses this option too)

## (oud) nieuws

- <http://kassa.vara.nl/tv/afspeelpagina/fragment/schokkend-nieuws-gevaarlijk-lek-in-internetbankieren-ontdekt/speel/1/>
- <http://webwereld.nl/beveiliging/82658-geld-stelen-via-hotspots-kon-door-lek-in-internetbankieren>

### **Schokkend nieuws: gevaarlijk lek in internetbankieren ontdekt**



**Trefwoorden:**

Internetbankieren, Gehackt, Banken, Onveilig, Nieuws

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# Countermeasures

- HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security)

Server declares *“I only talk HTTPS”*

**HTTP(S) Response Header:**

```
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15768000;  
includeSubDomain
```

- use [HTTPS Everywhere](#) browser plugin
- Other possible solutions in the pipeline: CERT Pinning & DNSSEC for TLS

## Alternative MitM attack: stealing https cookies

- If secure flag is not set for a cookie, then the cookie set in an https session will also be sent over with http requests
- A MitM attacker can then try to steal the cookie



# Alternative MitM attack: stealing https cookies

## Attack steps

1. user logs on to `https://bank.com`
2. server sets session ID for `bank.com` in cookie
  - which is encrypted in https-traffic
3. users ask for an unencrypted HTTP request (eg for `http://nu.nl`)
4. MitM attacker replies with a redirect to `http://bank.com`
5. Browser follows redirect and sends the bank's cookie over http
6. Bingo! Attacker has the cookie

