

Formal models of bank cards for free

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Introduction

- Active learning on bank cards
- Learn state machines of implementations
- Dutch, German, Swedish and UK debit and credit cards
 - All implementations of EMV standard



EMV

- Standard for payment cards
- Started in 1993 by EuroPay, MasterCard and Visa
- Over 1 billion cards in use
- Required for Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA)
- Over 700 pages of specifications
- EMV-CAP for online banking




EMV transaction

- Initialisation
- Cardholder verification
 - Offline PIN
- Card authentication
 - SDA / DDA / CDA
- Transaction
 - Online / offline
 - Confirmed by cryptogram (TC / AAC / ARQC)


Learning

- LearnLib used
 - Implementation of adapted L^* algorithm
- Deterministic Mealy machine $M = (I, O, Q, q^0, \delta, \lambda)$
- Equivalence queries approximated
 - Random (1000 traces of length 10-50)
 - W-Method



Learning

- Custom test harness for EMV smartcards
 - In total 15 different commands
 - Input symbols: commands
 - Output symbols: status words (optionally with cryptogram type)



Test harness

- Java
- Around 300 lines of code
- Standard library for communication with smartcards
- Separate method for each input symbol
- Parameters fixed
 - Random number
 - PIN code
- Variations of instructions
- Bank's secret key unknown

Commands

- SELECT
- GET PROCESSING OPTIONS
 - Correct / incorrect parameters
- GET DATA
 - Existing / non-existing data
- READ RECORD
 - Existing / non-existing records
- VERIFY
- INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
- GENERATE AC
 - 6 variations

Initialisation

Cardholder verification


Card authentication

Transaction


Results

- Learned 33 models for 16 cards
- Between 855 and 1695 membership queries
- Less than 20 minutes to construct final hypothesis
- 4 to 8 states learned
- Most cards did not follow state machine specified by MasterCard
- No security problems found


Results




Results



Maestro cards




Rabobank Maestro




Volksbank Maestro



EMV-CAP




EMV-CAP




Error handling




Data authentication



Data authentication




Data authentication



Learning the ATC

- Application Transaction Counter
- Possible for card supporting GET DATA for ATC
- Added a mapper around test harness
 - Request ATC before and after every command

Result



Using these diagrams

- Reverse engineering
 - Manual inspection of correctness and security
- Fuzzing or model-based testing
 - Use as basis for automated fuzz testing
- Formal verification
 - Use as basis for model checking

Conclusion

- Obtained useful models for EMV cards
- Gives insight in different design decisions
- Helpful in security or compliance evaluations
- Most cards did not follow state machine specified by MasterCard
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Thanks for your attention!