## Spot the defect!

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{    if (argc > 1)
        printf(argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```

This program is vulnerable to format string attacks, where calling the program with strings containing special characters can result in a buffer overflow attack.

## Format string attacks

Type of memory corruption discovered in 2000

- Strings can contain special characters, eg %s in printf("Cannot find file %s", filename);
   Such strings are called format strings
- What happens if we execute the code below?
   printf("Cannot find file %s");
- What can happen if we execute
   printf(string)
   where string is user-supplied?
   Esp. if it contains special characters, eg %s, %x, %n, %hn?

## Format string attacks

If attacker can control malicious input s to printf(s) then this can

read the stack

dumps the stack, including passwords, keys,... stored on the stack

- corrupt the stack
   %n writes the number of characters printed to the stack
  - so input 12345678%n writes the value 8 to the stack
- read arbitrary memory
   a carefully crafted input string of the form

```
\xEF\xCD\xCD\xAB %x%x...%x%s
```

print the string at memory address ABCDCDEF

## Preventing format string attacks is **EASY**

```
1. Always replace printf(str)
with printf("%s", str)
```

2. Compiler or static analysis (SAST) tool could warn if the number of arguments does not match the format string

```
As e.g. in printf ("x is %i and y is %i", x);
```

gcc has (too many!) command line options to get such warnings
-Wformat -Wformat-no-literal -Wformat-security...

But: if the format string is not a compile-time constant, we cannot decide this at compile time (3)

Would you want your compiler or SAST tool to give a false positive or a false negative in such cases?

Check https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=format+string to see how common format strings still are