Software Security

Fuzzing (continued)

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Last week

1. Dumb, random fuzzing
2. Mutation-based - apply random mutations to valid inputs
   - Example OCPP
   - Tools: Radamsa, zzuf, …
3. Generation-based aka grammar-based
   - Example GSM
   - Pro: can reach ‘deeper’ bugs than 1 & 2 ☺
   - Con: but lots of work to construct fuzzer or grammar ☹
   - Tools: Boofuzz, SNOOZE, SPIKE, Peach, Sulley, antiparser, Netzob, …



Less shallow

This week: more advanced forms of fuzzing

1. Dumb, random fuzzing
2. Mutational fuzzing

   example: OCPP
3. Generational fuzzing aka grammar-based fuzzing

   example: GSM
4. Whitebox fuzzing with SAGE

   using symbolic execution
5. Code-coverage guided evolutionary fuzzing with `afl`

Whitebox fuzzing with SAGE

Whitebox fuzzing using symbolic execution

- The central problem with fuzzing: how can we generate inputs that trigger interesting code executions?

  Eg fuzzing the procedure below is unlikely to hit the error case

```
int foo(int x) {
    y = x+3;
    if (y==13) abort(); // error
}
```

- The idea behind whitebox fuzzing: if we know the code, then by analysing the code we can find interesting input values to try.
- SAGE from Microsoft Research that uses symbolic execution of x86 binaries to generate test cases.

```
m(int x,y){
    x = x + y;
    y = y - x;
    if (2*y > 8) { ...
                 }
    else if (3*x < 10){ ...
                       }
    }
```

Can you provide values for `x` and `y` that will trigger execution of the two if-branches?

Symbolic execution

```
m(int x,y){
    x = x + y;
    y = y – x;
    if (2*y > 8) { ...
                 }
    else if (3*x < 10){ ...
    }                  }
```

Suppose `x` *= N and* `y` *= M.*

`x` *becomes N+M*

`y` *becomes M - (N+M) = -N*

*if-branch taken if 2 * -N > 8, i.e. N < -4*

Aka the path condition

2nd if-branch taken if
*N ≥ -4 AND 3 * (M+N) < 10*

Given a set of constraints, an SMT solver (Yikes, Z3, …) produces values that satisfy it, or proves that it are not satisfiable.

This generates test data (i) *automatically* and (ii) *with good coverage*

- **SMT solvers can also be used for static analyses as in PREfast, or more generally, for program verification**

Symbolic execution for test generation

- Symbolic execution can be used to automatically generate test cases with good coverage
- Basic idea instead of giving variables concrete values (say 42), variables are given symbolic values (say α or N), and program is executed with these symbolic values to see when certain program points are reached
- *Downsides of symbolic execution?*
  - Very expensive (in time & space)
  - Things explode if there are loops or recursion, or if you make heavy use of the heap
  - You cannot pass symbolic values as input to some APIs, system calls, I/O peripherals, …

  SAGE mitigates these by using a *single concrete execution* to obtain *symbolic constraints* to generate *many* test inputs for *many* execution paths

SAGE example

Example program

```
void top(char input[4]) {
    int cnt = 0;
    if (input[0] == 'b') cnt++;
    if (input[1] == 'a') cnt++;
    if (input[2] == 'd') cnt++;
    if (input[3] == '!') cnt++;
    if (cnt >= 3) crash();
}
```

What would be interesting test cases?

Do you think a fuzzer could find them?

How could you find them?

SAGE example

Example program

```
void top(char input[4]) {
    int cnt = 0;
    if (input[0] == 'b') cnt++;
    if (input[1] == 'a') cnt++;
    if (input[2] == 'd') cnt++;
    if (input[3] == '!') cnt++;
    if (cnt >= 3) crash();
}
```

path contraints:

$i_0 \neq$ 'b'

$i_1 \neq$ 'a'

$i_2 \neq$ 'd'

$i_3 \neq$ '!'

SAGE executes the code for some concrete `input`, say `'good'`

It then collects *path constraints* for an arbitrary symbolic input of the form $i_0 i_1 i_2 i_3$

Search space for interesting inputs

Based on this *one* execution, combining the 4 constraints found & their negations, yields $2^4 = 16$ test cases



Note: the initial execution with the input 'good' was not very interesting, but some of these others are

SAGE success

SAGE was very successful at uncovering security bugs, eg

Microsoft Security Bulletin MS07-017 aka CVE-2007-0038: Critical

Vulnerabilities in GDI Could Allow Remote Code Execution

Stack-based buffer overflow in the animated cursor code in Windows … allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code … via a large length value in the second (or later) anih block of a RIFF .ANI, cur, or .ico file, which results in memory corruption when processing cursors, animated cursors, and icons

Root cause: vulnerablity in PARSING of RIFF .ANI, cur, and ico-formats.

NB SAGE automatically generates inputs triggering this bug *without* knowing these formats

[Godefroid et al., *SAGE: Whitebox Fuzzing for Security Testing*, ACM Queue 2012]

[Patrice Godefroid, *Fuzzing: Hack, Art, and Science*, Communications of the ACM, 2020]

Coverage-guided evolutionary fuzzing with `afl`

(American Fuzzy Lop)

Evolutionary Fuzzing

Use evolution:

try random input mutations, and

observe the effect on some form of coverage, and

let only the interesting mutations evolve further

where “interesting” = resulting in ‘new’ execution paths

Aka coverage-guided evolutionary greybox fuzzing,

but terminology is a bit messy/non-standard

alf: observing jumps to find interesting inputs/input changes

input

code

line	instruction
1	**JMP 6**
2	..
3	..
4	..
5	**JZ (Jump If Zero) 7**
6	..
7	*arraycopy (dst, input[i..j]);*
8	
9	..
10	**JCXZ 2**
11	..
12	..
13	*println (part of input);*
14	..
15	**JNE 103131**
16	..

afl bitmap `shared_mem`



afl [http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl]

- Code instrumented to observe execution paths:
  - if source code is available, by using modified compiler
  - if source code is not available, by running code in an emulator
- Code coverage represented as a 64KB bitmap:
  each control flow jumps is mapped to a change in this bitmap
  Different executions could result in same bitmap, but chance is small
- Mutation strategies applied to set of seeds include bit flips, incrementing/decrementing integers, using pre-defined interesting values (eg. 0, -1, MAX_INT,....) or, deleting/combining/zeroing input blocks, plus – optionally - user-supplied dictionary
- For speed, afl(++) forks the SUT to speed up the fuzzing and uses in-memory fuzzing
- Big win: no need to specify the input format, but still good coverage

afl's instrumentation of compiled code

Code is injected at every branch point in the code

```
cur_location = <SOME_RANDOM_NUMBER_FOR_THIS_CODE_BLOCK>;

shared_mem[cur_location ^ prev_location]++;

prev_location = cur_location >> 1;
```

where `shared_mem` is a 64 KB memory region

Intuition: for every jump from L_1 to L_2 a different byte in `shared_mem` is changed (increased).

Which byte is determined by random values chosen at compile time inserted at source and destination of every jump


american fuzzy lop 2.52b (dnsmasq)
process timing
run time : 0 days, 20 hrs, 31 min, 27 sec
last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 48 min, 28 sec
last uniq crash : 0 days, 2 hrs, 22 min, 39 sec
last uniq hang : none seen yet
overall results
cycles done : 3
total paths : 3409
uniq crashes : 12
uniq hangs : 0
cycle progress
now processing : 3138* (92.05%)
paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)
map coverage
map density : 0.34% / 4.51%
count coverage : 2.92 bits/tuple
stage progress
now trying : user extras (insert)
stage execs : 509k/1.38M (36.79%)
total execs : 29.4M
exec speed : 464.9/sec
findings in depth
favored paths : 686 (20.12%)
new edges on : 1022 (29.98%)
total crashes : 363 (12 unique)
total tmouts : 54 (18 unique)
fuzzing strategy yields
bit flips : 151/1.22M, 104/1.22M, 47/1.22M
byte flips : 0/152k, 2/61.4k, 4/59.8k
arithmetics : 133/3.47M, 0/1.04M, 0/286k
known ints : 32/264k, 29/1.62M, 10/2.55M
dictionary : 103/2.43M, 48/5.49M, 176/1.58M
havoc : 1060/6.14M, 0/0
trim : 40.91%/56.3k, 58.16%
path geometry
levels : 17
pending : 2326
pend fav : 7
own finds : 1887
imported : n/a
stability : 100.00%
^C
[cpu000:150%]
+++ Testing aborted by user +++
[+] We're done here. Have a nice day!

OSS Fuzz

Free fuzzing service by Google for open source projects

- **Google actually paid people to fuzz their code for them**
- **By May 2025, OSS-Fuzz has found 13,000 vulnerabilities and 50,000 bugs across 1,000 projects**
- **OSS-Fuzz uses afl++, HongFuzz and libfuzzer**
  - **Details at https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz**
  - **See presentation by Kostya Serebryany,at USENIX Security 2017 Google https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n6kP-CWO_0Q**

You could look for evidence that your case study has <u>not</u> been enrollled in OSS-Fuzz

Cool example: learning the JPG file format

Fuzzing a program that expects a JPG as input, starting with 'hello world' as initial test input, afl can learn to produce legal JPG files

along the way producing/discovering error messages such as

- `Not a JPEG file: starts with 0x68 0x65`
- `Not a JPEG file: starts with 0xff 0x65`
- `Premature end of JPEG file`
- `Invalid JPEG file structure: two SOI markers`
- `Quantization table 0x0e was not defined`

and then JPGs like



[Source http://lcamtuf.blogspot.nl/2014/11/pulling-jpegs-out-of-thin-air.html]

Other strategies in evolutionary fuzzing

Instead of maximizing path/code coverage, we can also let inputs evolve to maximize some other variable or property

- **Code may need to instrumented to let fuzzer observe that property**



Eg the x-coordinate of Super Mario

[Aschermann et al., *IJON: Exploring Deep State Spaces via Fuzzing,* IEEE S&P 2020]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3PyhXlHDkNI

Conclusions

- Fuzzing is great technique to find (some) security flaws!
- If you ever write or use C(++) code, you should fuzz it.
- Challenge: getting good coverage fuzzing without too much effort

  Successful approaches include

  - White-box fuzzing based on symbolic execution with SAGE
  - Evolutionary fuzzing aka coverage guided greybox fuzzing with `afl`
- *Does fuzzing makes sense for code in other programming languages?*

  Yes, although bugs found may have lower security impact
- A more ambitious generation of tools not only tries to find security flaws, but also to then build exploits, eg. `angr`

To read (see links on the course page)

- Michal Zawleski, technical white paper for afl
- Patrice Godefroid, *Fuzzing: Hack, Art, and Science*, CACM 2020

Quick security assessment of C/C++ code

crashes with a dumb fuzzer

crashes with afl

crashes with afl & ASan

does not crash with any fuzzer

Fuzzing for other bugs than memory corruption?

- *How could a fuzzer detect SQL injections or XSS weaknesses?*
  - For SQL injection: monitor database for error messages
  - For XSS, see if the website echoes HTML tags in user input
- There are various tools to fuzz web-applications: Spike proxy, HP Webinspect, AppScan, WebScarab, Wapiti, w3af, RFuzz, WSFuzzer, SPI Fuzzer Burp, Mutilidae, …
- Some fuzzers crawl a website, generating traffic themselves, other fuzzers modify traffic generated by some other means.
- *Can we expect false positives/negatives?*
  - false negatives due to test cases not hitting the vulnerable cases
  - false positives & negatives due to incorrect test oracle, eg
    - for SQL injection: not recognizing some SQL database errors (false neg)
    - for XSS: signaling quoted echoed response as XSS (false pos)