Software Security

Language-based Security:
'Safe' programming languages
[Chapter 3 of lecture notes]

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Producing more secure code

You can try to produce more secure C(++) code. Not just SAST & DAST, but more importantly:

by reading – and making other people read

- CERT secure coding guidelines for C and C++ at http://www.securecoding.cert.org

- Secure Coding in C and C++, R.C. Seacord

- 24 deadly sins of software security, M. Howard, D LeBlanc & J. Viega, 2005

- Secure programming for Linux and UNIX HOWTO, D. Wheeler

- ...

More structural way to improve security: improve the programming language

- not just to prevent memory corruptions flaws, but maybe other common problems too…
Language-based security

Security features & guarantees provided by programming language

• **safety guarantees**, incl. memory-safety, type-safety, thread-safety

  There are many flavours & levels of 'safety' here.
  Eg. different type systems give different notions of type-safety.

• forms of **access control**
  – visibility/access restrictions with eg. public, private
  – sandboxing mechanism inside programming language

• forms of **information flow control**

Some features dependent on each other, eg
  – type safety & just about anything else relies on memory safety
  – sandboxing relying on memory & type safety

This week: **safety**. See course lecture notes, chapters 2 & 3
Other ways the programming language can help

A programming language can also help security by

- **offering good APIs/libraries,** e.g.
  - APIs with parametrised queries/prepared statements for SQL
  - more secure string libraries for C
- **incorporating support for 'external' languages,**
  - e.g. support for SQL and HTML in Wyvern
- **offering convenient language features,**
  - esp. *exceptions,* to simplify handling error conditions
- **making assurance of the security easier,** by
  - being able to understand code in a modular way
  - only having to review the public interface, in a code review

These properties *require* some form of safety
(Aside: safety vs security)

Common source of confusion!

- **safety**: protecting a system from *accidental* failures (esp. protecting humans from harm)
- **security**: protecting a system from *active* attackers

Precise border hard to pin down, but what is good for safety is also good for security, so often the distinction is not so relevant.

In Dutch, the confusion is even worse: *veiligheid* vs *beveiliging*. 
'Safe' programming languages?

You can write insecure programs in ANY programming language.

Eg

• You can **forget or screw up forget input validation** in any language
• **Flaws in the program logic** can never be ruled out

Still...some safety features can be nice
General idea behind safety

Under which conditions does $a[i] = (\text{byte})b$ make sense?

Two approaches
1. the programmer is responsible for ensuring these conditions
   “unsafe” approach
2. the language is responsible for checking this
   “safe” approach

Heated debates about the pros & cons highlight tension between flexibility, speed and control vs safety & security

But note:

- execution speed $\neq$ speed of development of secure code
- and maybe programmers are more expensive than CPU cycles?
Safe programming languages

Safe programming languages

• impose some *discipline or restrictions* on the programmer
• offer some *abstractions* to the programmer, with associated *guarantees*

This takes away some freedom & flexibility from the programmer, but hopefully extra safety and clearer understanding makes it worth this.
Attempts at a general definition of safety

A programming language can be considered \textit{safe} if

1. You can trust the abstractions provided by the programming language
   The programming language enforces these abstractions and guarantees that they cannot be broken
   • Eg a boolean is either \texttt{true} or \texttt{false}, and never 23 or \texttt{null}
   • Programmer doesn't have to care if \texttt{true} is represented as 0x00 and \texttt{false} as 0xFF or vice versa

2. Programs have a \textit{precise \& well defined semantics} (ie. meaning)
   - More generally, leaving things \textit{UNDEFINED} in any specification is asking for security trouble

3. You can understand the behaviour of programs in a \textit{modular} way
'safer' & 'unsafe' languages

Warning: this is overly simplistic, as there are many dimensions of safety

Spoiler alert: functional languages such as Haskell are safe because data is immutable (no side-effects)
Dimensions & levels of safety

There are many dimensions of safety

memory-safety, type-safety, thread-safety, arithmetic safety; guarantees about (non)nullness, about immutability, about the absence of aliasing,...

For some dimensions, there can be many levels of safety

Eg, in increasing level of safety, going outside array bounds may:

1. let an attacker inject arbitrary code
2. *possibly* crash the program (or else corrupt some data)
3. *definitely* crash the program
4. throw an exception, which the program can catch to handle the issue gracefully
5. be ruled out at compile-time
Safety: how?

Mechanisms to provide safety include

• **compile time checks**, eg **type checking**

• **runtime checks**, eg **array bounds checks**, checks for **nullness**, runtime **type checks**, ...

• **automated memory management using a garbage collector**
  – so programmer does not have to `free()` heap-allocated data

• using an **execution engine**, to do the things above
  – Eg the **Java Virtual Machine (VM)**, which
    • runs the **bytecode verifier (bcv)** to type-check code,
    • performs some runtime checks
    • periodically invokes the garbage collector
Compiled binaries vs execution engines

Compiled binary runs on bare hardware

Any defensive measures have to be compiled into the code.

Execution engine (aka ‘runtime’) isolates code from hardware

The programming language / platform still ‘exists’ at runtime, and the execution engine can provide checks at runtime.
Memory-safety
Memory-safety – two different flavours

A programming language is memory-safe if it guarantees that

1. programs can never access unallocated or de-allocated memory
    • hence also: no segmentation faults at runtime
2. maybe also: program can never access uninitialised memory

Here

1. means we could switch off OS access control to memory. Assuming there are no bugs in our execution engine...
2. means we don't have to zero out memory before de-allocating it to avoid information leaks (within the same program). Again, assuming there are no bugs in our execution engine...
Memory safety

Unsafe language features that break memory safety

- no array bounds checks
- pointer arithmetic
- null pointers, *but only if these cause undefined behaviour*
Null pointers in C

Common (and incorrect!) folklore:

dereferencing a NULL pointer will crash the program.

But, the C standard only guarantees

the result of dereferencing a null pointer is undefined.

So it may crash the program, but \textcolor{red}{\textbf{anything else}} might happen

See the CERT Secure Coding guidelines for C

https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/c/EXP34-C.+Do+not+dereference+null+pointer

for discussion of a security vulnerability in a PNG library caused by a null dereference that didn't crash (on ARM processors).
Memory safety

Unsafe language features that break memory safety

- no array bounds checks
- pointer arithmetic
- null pointers, but only if these cause undefined behaviour
- manual memory management

Manual memory management can be avoided by

1. not using the heap at all (eg in MISRA C), or
2. automating it with a garbage collector
   1. Garbage collection first used in LISP in 1959, and went mainstream with Java in 1995
3. There are ways to automate memory management without a garbage collection, eg. using ownership type systems, as in Rust
Type-safety
Types

- **Types** assert invariant properties of program elements. Eg
  - This variable will always hold an integer
  - This function will always return an object of class X (or one of its subclasses)
    - This array will never store more than 10 items
  NB there is a *wide range of expressivity* in type systems!

- **Type checking** verifies these assertions. This can be done
  - at compile time (static typing) or
  - at runtime (dynamic typing)
    or a combination.

- **Type soundness** (aka type safety or strong typing)
  A language is **type sound** if the assertions are guaranteed to hold at run-time
public class Demo{
    static private string greeting = "Hello";
    final static int CONST = 43;

    static void Main (string[] args){
        foreach (string name in args){
            Console.WriteLine(sayHello(name));
        }
    }

    public static string sayHello(string name){
        return greeting + name;
    }

    }
}

**Type information & ideally guarantees**

- greeting only accessible in class Demo
- CONST will *always* be 43
- sayHello will always return a string
- sayHello will always be called with 1 parameter of type string
Type-safety

Type-safety programming language guarantees that programs that pass the type-checker can only manipulate data in ways allowed by their types

- So you cannot multiply booleans, dereference an integer, take the square root of reference, etc.

  NB: this removes lots of room for undefined behaviour

- For OO languages: no “Method not found” errors at runtime
Combinations of memory & type safety

Programming languages can be

- **memory-safe, typed, and type sound:**
  - Java, C#, Rust, Go
    - though some of these have loopholes to allow unsafety
  - Functional languages such as Haskell, ML, Clean, F#

- **memory-safe and untyped**
  - LISP, Prolog, many interpreted languages

- **memory-unsafe, typed, and type-unsafe**
  - C, C++

  Not type sound: using pointer arithmetic in C, you can break any guarantees the type system could possibly make

More generally: without any memory safety, ensuring type safety is impossible.
Example – breaking type soundness in C++

```cpp
class DiskQuota {
    private:
        int MinBytes;
        int MaxBytes;
};

void EvilCode(DiskQuota* quota) {
    // use pointer arithmetic to access
    // the quota object in any way we like!
    ((int*)quota)[1] = MAX_INT;
}

NB For a C(++) program we can make no guarantees whatsoever in the presence of untrusted code.

So
• a buffer overflow in some library can be fatal
• in a code review we have to look at all code to make guarantees
Ruling out buffer overflows in Java or C#

Ruled out at language-level, by combination of
• **compile-time typechecking** (**static** checks)
  - or at **load-time**, by bytecode verifier (**bcv**)
  - **runtime checks** (**dynamic** checks)

What runtime checks are performed when executing the code below?

```java
public class A extends Super{
    protected int[] d;
    private A next;

    public A() { d = new int[3]; }
    public void m(int j) { d[0] = j; }
    public setNext(Object s)
    {
        next = (A)s;
    }
}
```

**runtime checks for**
1) non-nullness of d, and 2) array bound

**runtime check for**
(type (down)cast)
Remaining buffer overflow issues in Java or C#

Buffer overflows can still exist, namely:

1. in native code
2. for C#, in code blocks declared as **unsafe**
3. through bugs in the Virtual Machine (VM) implementation, which is typically written in C++....
4. through bugs in the implementation of the type checker, or worse, bugs in the type system (unsoundness)

The VM (incl. the type checker aka byte code verifier) is part of the *Trusted Computing Base (TCB) for memory and type-safety*,

Hence 3 & 4: bugs in this TCB can break these properties.
Breaking type safety?

Type safety is an extremely fragile property:
one tiny flaw brings the whole type system crashing down

Data values and objects are just blobs of memory. If we can create type confusion, by having two references with different types pointing the same blob of memory, then all type guarantees are gone.

• Example: type confusion attack on Java in Netscape 3.0:

```
public class A[]{ ... }
```

Netscape's Java execution engine confused this type `A[]` with the type `array of A`

Root cause: `[` and `]` should not be allowed in class names

So this is an input validation problem!
Type confusion attacks

```java
public class A{
    public Object x;
    ...
}

What if we could compile B against A but we run it against A?

We can do pointer arithmetic again!

If Java Virtual Machine would allow such so-called *binary incompatible* classes to be loaded, the whole type system would break.

```
How do we know a type system is sound? (1)

- **Representation independence** (for booleans)
  
  it does not matter if we represent true as 0 and false as 1 (or FF), or vice versa

  - ie. if we execute a given program with either representation, the result is guaranteed to be the same

- We could test this, or try to prove it.

  *Given a formal mathematical definition of the programming language, we could prove that it does not matter how true and false are represented for all programs*

- Similar properties should hold for all datatypes.
How do we know type system is sound? (2)

Give two formal definitions of the programming language

- **a typed operational semantics**, which records and checks type information at runtime
- **an untyped operational semantics**, which does not

and prove their equivalence for all well-typed programs.

Or, in other words, prove the equivalence of

- **a defensive execution engine** (which records and checks *all* type information at runtime) and
- **a normal execution engine** which does not

for any program that passes the type checker.

People have formalised the semantics and type system of eg Java, using theorem provers (Coq, Isabelle/HOL), to prove such results.
Ongoing evolution to richer type systems: non-null vs nullable

Many ways to enrich type systems further, eg

- **Distinguish non-null & possibly-null (aka nullable) types**

  ```java
  public @NonNull String hello = "hello";
  ```

- to improve efficiency

- to prevent null pointer bugs or detect (some/all?) of them earlier, at compile time

- **Support for this has become mainstream:**
  - C# supports nullable types written as `A?` or `Nullable<A>`
  - In Java you can use type annotations `@Nullable` and `@NonNull`
  - Scala, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, and Ceylon have non-null vs nullable aka option(al) types

- Typically languages take the approach that references are non-null by default
Ongoing evolution to richer type systems: aliasing & information flow

• **Alias control**
  restrict possible interferences between modules due to aliasing.
  
  – More on the risk of aliasing later this lecture

• **Information flow**
  controlling on the way tainted information flows through an implementation.
  
  – More on type systems for information flow in later lectures.
Other language-based guarantees

- **visibility**: public, private, etc
  - eg private fields not accessible from outside a class

- **immutability**
  - of **primitive values (ie constants)**
    - in Java: `final int i = 5;`
    - in C(++): `const int BUF_SIZE = 128;`
  
  Beware: meaning of `const` is confusing for C(++) pointers & objects!

  - of **objects**
    - In Java, for example `String` objects are immutable

Scala, Rust, Ceylon, and Kotlin provides a more systematic distinction between mutable and immutable data to promote the use of immutable data structures
Safe arithmetic

What happens if \( i = i + 1; \) overflows?

What would be unsafe or safe(r) approaches?

1. **Unsafest approach:** leaving this as undefined behavior
   - eg C and C++

2. **Safer approach:** specifying how over/underflow behaves
   - eg based on 32 or 64 bit two-complements behaviour
   - eg Java and C#

3. **Safer still:** integer overflow results in an exception
   - eg checked mode in C#

4. **Safest:** have infinite precision integers & reals, so overflow never happens
   - Some experiments in functional programming languages
Thread-safety
&
Aliasing
Problems with threads (ie. lack of thread safety)

- Two concurrent execution threads both execute the statement
  \[ x = x + 1; \]
  where \( x \) initially has the value 0.

  *What is the value of \( x \) in the end?*

  - Answer: \( x \) can have value 2 or 1

- The root cause of the problem is a data race: \( x = x + 1 \) is not an atomic operation, but happens in two steps - reading \( x \) and assigning it the new value - which may be interleaved in unexpected ways

- Why can this lead to security problems?

  Think of internet banking, and running two simultaneous sessions with the same bank account... *Do try this at home!* 😊
Weird multi-threading behaviour in Java

class A {
    private int i ;
    A() { i = 5 ;}
    int geti() { return i; }
}

Can geti() ever return something else than 5?
Yes!

Thread 1, initialising x
static A x = new A();

Thread 2, accessing x
j = x.geti();

You'd think that here x.geti() returns 5 or throws an exception, depending on whether thread 1 has initialised x

Hence: x.geti() in thread 2 can return 0 instead of 5

Execution of thread 1 takes in 3 steps
1. allocate new object m
2. m.i = 5;
3. x = m;

the compiler or VM is allowed to swap the order of these statements, because they don't affect each other
Weird multi-threading behaviour in Java

```java
class A {
    private final int i;
    A() { i = 5; }
    int geti() { return i; }
}
```

Now `geti()` always return 5.

Declaring a private field as `final` fixes this particular problem
- due to ad-hoc restrictions on the initialisation of final fields
- A revision of the Java Memory Model specifies how compilers & VM (incl. underlying hardware) can deal with concurrency, in 2004.
- The API implementation of String was only fixed in Java 2 (aka 1.5)
Data races and thread-safety

• A program contains a **data race** if two execution threads simultaneously access the same variable and at least one of these accesses is a write

  NB data races are highly non-deterministic, and a pain to debug!

• **thread-safety** = the behaviour of a program consisting of several threads can be understood as an interleaving of those threads

• In Java, the semantics of a program with data races is effectively undefined, i.e. only programs without data races are thread-safe

  Moral of the story:

  *Even purportedly “safe” programming languages can have very weird behaviour in presence of concurrency*

• The programming language **Rust** aims to guarantee the absence of data races, i.e. thread-safety, at the language level

• Other modern programming language are also introducing features to help with thread safety, e.g. `@ThreadLocal` annotations in Kotlin
Why things often break in C(++), Java, C#, ...

Dangerous combination: **ALIASING & MUTATION**

**Aliasing**: two threads or objects A and B both have a reference to the same object shared

This is the root cause of many problems, not just with concurrency

1. **in concurrent** (aka multi-threaded) context: **data races**
   - Locking objects (eg synchronized methods in Java) can help, but: expensive & risk of deadlock

2. **in single-threaded** context: **dangling pointers**
   - Who is responsible for free-ing shared? A or B?

3. **in single-threaded** context: **broken assumptions**
   - If A changes the shared object, this may break B's code, because B's assumptions about shared are broken
References to mutable data are dangerous

In multi-threaded programs, aliasing of mutable data structures can be problematic, as the referenced data can change,

• even in safe programming languages such as Java or C#!

```java
1  public void f(char[] x){
2       if (x[0] != 'a') { throw new Exception(); }
3       // Can we assume that x[0] is the letter 'a' here?
4       // No!! Another concurrent execution thread could
5       //      change the content of x at any moment
```

If there is aliasing, another thread can modify the content of the array at any moment.
References to immutable data are less dangerous

In a multi-threaded program, aliasing of immutable data structures are safer.

```java
public void f(String x){
    if (x.charAt(0) != 'a') { throw new Exception(); }

    // We CAN assume that x[0] is the letter 'a' here?
    // Yes, as Java Strings are immutable

    ...}
```

Another thread with a reference to the same string cannot change the value (or ‘contents’) of the string, as Java strings are immutable.

Kotlin has annotation `@SharedImmutable` to explicitly mark objects as being immutable & (therefore) safe to share