


# Triple and Quadruple Encryption: Bridging the Gaps

Bart Mennink and Bart Preneel  
KU Leuven (Belgium)

Dagstuhl — January 6, 2014



# Introduction




1977

DES

$\kappa = 56$


$n = 64$

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
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
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1991	IDEA	$\kappa = 128$	$n = 64$
2001	AES	$\kappa \geq 128$	$n = 128$


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
- 19 • Triple-DES still broadly used
- 19 • >1600 by NIST validated implementations
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- 20 • ATMs, EMV, TLS, Microsoft, ...

## Introduction: Triple-DES



- Double-DES: only marginal security increase
- Triple-DES
  - $E \circ D \circ E$  versus  $E \circ E \circ E$
  - $k_1 = k_3$  versus  $k_1 \neq k_3$


# Introduction: Cascade Encryption



- $\kappa, n$  arbitrary
- $r' := \lceil r/2 \rceil$



# Introduction: Cascade Encryption



- $\kappa, n$  arbitrary
- $r' := \lceil r/2 \rceil$
- Ideal cipher model
- Information-theoretic distinguisher has access to  $E$

## State of the Art

rounds	security	attack	tight
$r = 1, 2$	$\kappa$	$\kappa$ [DH77]	✓
$r = 3, 4$	$\kappa + \min\{\kappa/2, n/2\}$ [BR06,GM09]	$\kappa + n/2$ [Luc98,Gaž13]	✗
$r \geq 5$	$\kappa + \min\left\{\frac{(r'-1)}{r'}\kappa, n/2\right\}$ [GM09]	$\kappa + \frac{r'-1}{r'}n$ [Gaž13]	✗

- [Lee13]:  $\kappa + \min\{\kappa, n\} - \frac{16}{r}\left(\frac{n}{2} + 2\right)$  security if  $r \geq 16$

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Triple-DES:  $2^{84} \leq 2^{88}$

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
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
Main goal: tight security for triple encryption

## Improving Attacks




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
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- $\kappa = 0$ :



- Distinguishable from random in constant #queries

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


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


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- Attack idea:
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  - [DDKS12]: attack in  $2^{(r-\sqrt{2r})\kappa}$  in incomparable model

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Corollary: attack in  $2^{\kappa + \frac{r'-1}{r'} \min\{r'\kappa, n\}}$  queries

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
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
Main goal: tight security for triple encryption

## Tightening Security Bounds



- [BR06,GM09]: security up to  $2^{\kappa+\min\{\kappa/2,n/2\}}$  queries
- Attack in  $2^{\kappa+\min\{\kappa,n/2\}}$  queries (previous slide)


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


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
- Proof idea:
  - Gap due to rather isolated lemma of [BR06,GM09]
  - Improvement of lemma leads to tight security

## Tightening Security Bounds: Proof Idea






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[BR06, GM09] { }

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
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GM09] {

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 $q$  options

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
$\longleftrightarrow$   
 $q$  options

$\longleftrightarrow$   
 $2\alpha_1$  options

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
$(\alpha_1 = \max\{2e2^{\kappa-n}, 2n + \kappa\})$  }

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[BR06, GM09] {  $\begin{array}{ccc} \longleftrightarrow & \longleftrightarrow & \longleftrightarrow \\ q \text{ options} & 2\alpha_1 \text{ options} & q \text{ options} \\ \mathbf{E} = 2\alpha_1 q^2 & (\alpha_1 = \max\{2e2^{\kappa-n}, 2n + \kappa\}) & \end{array} \}$

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
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now  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \right\}$

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


[BR06, GM09]  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \longleftrightarrow \\ q \text{ options} \end{array} \right.$   $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \longleftrightarrow \\ 2\alpha_1 \text{ options} \end{array} \right.$   $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \longleftrightarrow \\ q \text{ options} \end{array} \right.$   $\left. \right\}$

$\mathbf{E} = 2\alpha_1 q^2$   $(\alpha_1 = \max\{2e2^{\kappa-n}, 2n + \kappa\})$

now  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \longrightarrow \\ \longleftarrow \end{array} \right.$

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$\longleftrightarrow$	$\longleftrightarrow$	$\longleftrightarrow$
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
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
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$2\alpha_2$ options	$q$ options
$\longleftarrow$	
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
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
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# Conclusions

rounds	security	attack	tight
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	$\kappa + \min\{\kappa, n/2\}$	$\kappa + \min\{\kappa, n/2\}$	✓
$r \geq 5$	$\kappa + \min\left\{\frac{(r'-1)}{r'}\kappa, n/2\right\}$ [GM09]	$\kappa + \frac{r'-1}{r'}n$ [Gaž13]	✗
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- Tight security for  $r \geq 5$  (non-trivial)?
- [Lee13]: asymptotic  $\kappa + \min\{\kappa, n\}$  security

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$r = 4$	$2^{88}$	$2^{88}$	$2^{121}$	$2^{56}$



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**Thank you for your attention!**