

On the Indifferentiability of the Grøstl Hash Function

Bart Mennink (K.U.Leuven)

Joint work with: Elena Andreeva and Bart Preneel

Security and Cryptography for Networks
Amalfi, Italy

September 13, 2010


Outline

- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 Differentiability of Grøstail
- 3 Indifferentiability of Grøstl
- 4 Conclusions

Outline


- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 Differentiability of Grøstail
- 3 Indifferentiability of Grøstl
- 4 Conclusions

Grøstl




- Grøstl: a second round SHA-3 candidate
- Grøstl supports digests of length $n = 224, 256, 384$ or 512 bits
- State size l larger than output size n : $l \geq 2n$

Grøstl




- Grøstl: a second round SHA-3 candidate
- Grøstl supports digests of length $n = 224, 256, 384$ or 512 bits
- State size l larger than output size n : $l \geq 2n$
- Messages of arbitrary length injectively padded into (M_1, \dots, M_k)

Grøstl




- Grøstl: a second round SHA-3 candidate
- Grøstl supports digests of length $n = 224, 256, 384$ or 512 bits
- State size l larger than output size n : $l \geq 2n$
- Messages of arbitrary length injectively padded into (M_1, \dots, M_k)
- f and Ω are based on two l -bit permutations P, Q
 - **Compression function**: $f(h, m) = P(h \oplus m) \oplus Q(m) \oplus h$
 - **Final transformation**: $\Omega(h) = P(h) \oplus h$

Grøstl



- Grøstl: a second round SHA-3 candidate
- Grøstl supports digests of length $n = 224, 256, 384$ or 512 bits
- State size l larger than output size n : $l \geq 2n$
- Messages of arbitrary length injectively padded into (M_1, \dots, M_k)
- f and Ω are based on two l -bit permutations P, Q
 - **Compression function**: $f(h, m) = P(h \oplus m) \oplus Q(m) \oplus h$
 - **Final transformation**: $\Omega(h) = P(h) \oplus h$

Grøstail



- **Grøstail**: last compression function with the final transformation (i.e., Grøstail is the 'tail' of Grøstl)


$$F(h, m) = P(f(h, m)) \oplus f(h, m)$$

Indifferentiability

- Distinguisher \mathcal{D} tries to differentiate a function C from a random oracle RO . \mathcal{D} is allowed to know the underlying structure of C

Indifferentiability


- Distinguisher \mathcal{D} tries to differentiate a function C from a random oracle RO . \mathcal{D} is allowed to know the underlying structure of C



- C with oracle access to G is indifferentiable from RO if there exists a simulator S such that for any \mathcal{D} these games are indistinguishable

Indifferentiability

- Distinguisher \mathcal{D} tries to differentiate a function C from a random oracle RO . \mathcal{D} is allowed to know the underlying structure of C



- C with oracle access to G is indistinguishable from RO if there exists a simulator S such that for any \mathcal{D} these games are indistinguishable
- Throughout: G denotes (P, Q) , and C is either $Grøstl$ or $Grøstail$

Assumption: P, Q are independent random permutations


Examples of Indifferentiable Constructions

- For f a random function (chop-Merkle-Damgård) [CDMP05]




Examples of Indifferentiable Constructions

- For f a random function (chop-Merkle-Damgård) [CDMP05]




- Application to Grøstl:




Examples of Indifferentiable Constructions

- For f a random function (chop-Merkle-Damgård) [CDMP05]




- Application to Grøstl:




Examples of Indifferentiable Constructions

- For f a random function (chop-Merkle-Damgård) [CDMP05]




- Application to Grøstl:



- However, for Grøstl, f is non-random (fixed-points $f(h, m) = h$)


Examples of Indifferentiable Constructions

- For f 'preimage aware' and g a random function [DRS09]




Examples of Indifferentiable Constructions

- For f 'preimage aware' and g a random function [DRS09]




- Application to Grøstl:




Examples of Indifferentiable Constructions

- For f 'preimage aware' and g a random function [DRS09]




- Application to Grøstl:




Examples of Indifferentiable Constructions

- For f 'preimage aware' and g a random function [DRS09]




- Application to Grøstl:




- However, for Grøstl, Ω is non-random (fixed-points $\Omega(h) = h$)

Examples of Indifferentiable Constructions

- For f 'preimage aware' and g a random function [DRS09]



- Application to Grøstl:




- However, for Grøstl, Ω is non-random (fixed-points $\Omega(h) = h$)
- Second attempt: consider $g := \text{chop} \circ \Omega \circ f = \text{chop} \circ F$

Outline


- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 Differentiability of Grøstail**
- 3 Indifferentiability of Grøstl
- 4 Conclusions

Differentiability of Grøstail




- Design a distinguisher that tricks *any* simulator

Differentiability of Grøstail




- Design a distinguisher that tricks *any* simulator
- Distinguisher is based on fixed-points for Grøstail

Differentiability of Grøstail




- Design a distinguisher that tricks *any* simulator
- Distinguisher is based on fixed-points for Grøstail
 - Inverse query 0 to Q^{-1} and obtain $x = Q^{-1}(0)$

Differentiability of Grøstail




- Design a distinguisher that tricks *any* simulator
- Distinguisher is based on fixed-points for Grøstail
 - Inverse query 0 to Q^{-1} and obtain $x = Q^{-1}(0)$
 - Inverse query x to P^{-1} and obtain $y = P^{-1}(x)$

Differentiability of Grøstail




- Design a distinguisher that tricks *any* simulator
- Distinguisher is based on fixed-points for Grøstail
 - Inverse query 0 to Q^{-1} and obtain $x = Q^{-1}(0)$
 - Inverse query x to P^{-1} and obtain $y = P^{-1}(x)$

Differentiability of Grøstail




- Design a distinguisher that tricks *any* simulator
- Distinguisher is based on fixed-points for Grøstail
 - Inverse query 0 to Q^{-1} and obtain $x = Q^{-1}(0)$
 - Inverse query x to P^{-1} and obtain $y = P^{-1}(x)$

Differentiability of Grøstail




- Design a distinguisher that tricks *any* simulator
- Distinguisher is based on fixed-points for Grøstail
 - Inverse query 0 to Q^{-1} and obtain $x = Q^{-1}(0)$
 - Inverse query x to P^{-1} and obtain $y = P^{-1}(x)$

Differentiability of Grøstail



- Design a distinguisher that tricks *any* simulator
- Distinguisher is based on fixed-points for Grøstail
 - Inverse query 0 to Q^{-1} and obtain $x = Q^{-1}(0)$
 - Inverse query x to P^{-1} and obtain $y = P^{-1}(x)$
 - For Grøstail, we have $F(x \oplus y, x) = x \oplus y$

Differentiability of Grøstail



- Design a distinguisher that tricks *any* simulator
- Distinguisher is based on fixed-points for Grøstail
 - Inverse query 0 to Q^{-1} and obtain $x = Q^{-1}(0)$
 - Inverse query x to P^{-1} and obtain $y = P^{-1}(x)$
 - For Grøstail, we have $F(x \oplus y, x) = x \oplus y$
- The simulator answers queries to Q^{-1} and P^{-1} such that the same relation holds for the random oracle: $RO(x \oplus y, x) = x \oplus y$
 → fixed-point for RO

Outline

- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 Differentiability of Grøstail
- 3 Indifferentiability of Grøstl
 - How to Prove Indifferentiability?
 - Design of the Simulator
- 4 Conclusions

How to Prove Indifferentiability?


- Construct a simulator S that mimics behavior of P, Q
- Answers from simulator need to be consistent with RO :
any relation between $Grøstl$ and P, Q , also holds between RO and S
- Simulator has access to RO

How to Prove Indifferentiability?

- Simulator maintains a graph (V, E) : edges represent evaluations of f

How to Prove Indifferentiability?

- Simulator maintains a graph (V, E) : edges represent evaluations of f
- Suppose $P(x_1) = y_1$ and $Q(x_2) = y_2$
Then $f(x_1 \oplus x_2, x_2) = x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus y_1 \oplus y_2$



- Edge denoted by $x_1 \oplus x_2 \xrightarrow{x_2} x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus y_1 \oplus y_2$

How to Prove Indifferentiability?



- Simulator considers tree $(r(V), E)$ starting from IV
- Suppose $IV \xrightarrow{M_1} v_1 \xrightarrow{M_2} v_2 \cdots v_{k-1} \xrightarrow{M_k} v_k$ is in the tree


How to Prove Indifferentiability?



- Simulator considers tree $(r(V), E)$ starting from IV
- Suppose $IV \xrightarrow{M_1} v_1 \xrightarrow{M_2} v_2 \cdots v_{k-1} \xrightarrow{M_k} v_k$ is in the tree

$$f(IV, M_1) = v_1$$


How to Prove Indifferentiability?



- Simulator considers tree $(r(V), E)$ starting from IV
- Suppose $IV \xrightarrow{M_1} v_1 \xrightarrow{M_2} v_2 \cdots v_{k-1} \xrightarrow{M_k} v_k$ is in the tree

$$f(IV, M_1) = v_1 \quad f(v_1, M_2) = v_2 \quad \dots \quad f(v_{k-1}, M_k) = v_k$$

How to Prove Indifferentiability?




- Simulator considers tree $(r(V), E)$ starting from IV
- Suppose $IV \xrightarrow{M_1} v_1 \xrightarrow{M_2} v_2 \cdots v_{k-1} \xrightarrow{M_k} v_k$ is in the tree

$$f(IV, M_1) = v_1 \quad f(v_1, M_2) = v_2 \quad \dots \quad f(v_{k-1}, M_k) = v_k$$

- Suppose $(M_1, \dots, M_k) = \text{pad}(M)$ for some M
 $\rightarrow P(v_k)$ should satisfy $\text{chop}_{l-n}(P(v_k) \oplus v_k) = RO(M)$

How to Prove Indifferentiability?



- Simulator considers tree $(r(V), E)$ starting from IV
- Suppose $IV \xrightarrow{M_1} v_1 \xrightarrow{M_2} v_2 \cdots v_{k-1} \xrightarrow{M_k} v_k$ is in the tree

$$f(IV, M_1) = v_1 \quad f(v_1, M_2) = v_2 \quad \dots \quad f(v_{k-1}, M_k) = v_k$$

- Suppose $(M_1, \dots, M_k) = \text{pad}(M)$ for some M
 $\rightarrow P(v_k)$ should satisfy $\text{chop}_{l-n}(P(v_k) \oplus v_k) = RO(M)$

Simulator can only guarantee this if v_k is queried to P
after path to v_k is paved!

Design of the Simulator

- Denote $\bar{r}(V)$: nodes in $r(V)$ labeled by a correctly padded message

Design of the Simulator

- Denote $\bar{r}(V)$: nodes in $r(V)$ labeled by a correctly padded message
- Simulator mimics $P, Q \rightarrow$ four interfaces $S_P, S_Q, S_{P^{-1}}, S_{Q^{-1}}$
- Simulator increases $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$ and $r(V)$ as little as possible
 - $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$: if $IV \xrightarrow{M} v$, we require $\text{chop}_{l-n}(P(v) \oplus v) = RO(M)$
 - $r(V)$: each path in $r(V)$ may eventually lead to a node in $\bar{r}(V)$

Design of the Simulator

- Denote $\bar{r}(V)$: nodes in $r(V)$ labeled by a correctly padded message
- Simulator mimics $P, Q \rightarrow$ four interfaces $S_P, S_Q, S_{P-1}, S_{Q-1}$
- Simulator increases $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$ and $r(V)$ as little as possible
 - $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$: if $IV \xrightarrow{M} v$, we require $\text{chop}_{l-n}(P(v) \oplus v) = RO(M)$
 - $r(V)$: each path in $r(V)$ may eventually lead to a node in $\bar{r}(V)$
- Sometimes, simulator may be forced to increase these sets

	S_P	S_Q	S_{P-1}	S_{Q-1}
$\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$	assure $\text{chop}(P(v) \oplus v)$ $= RO(M)$	—	—	—
$r(V)$	assure min. increase	assure min. increase	—	—

On query $S_P(x_1) \rightarrow y_1$:

$$y_1 \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_2^l \setminus \text{rng}(P)$$

if S is forced to increase $r(V)$:

assure minimal increase

if S is forced to increase $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$:

assure $\text{chop}_{l-n}(y_1 \oplus x_1) = RO(M)$

On query $S_Q(x_2) \rightarrow y_2$:

$$y_2 \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_2^l \setminus \text{rng}(Q)$$

if S is forced to increase $r(V)$:

assure minimal increase

avoid increasing $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$

On query $S_{P^{-1}}(y_1) \rightarrow x_1$:

$$x_1 \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_2^l \setminus \text{dom}(P)$$

avoid increasing $r(V)$

avoid increasing $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$

On query $S_{Q^{-1}}(y_2) \rightarrow x_2$:


$$x_2 \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_2^l \setminus \text{dom}(Q)$$

avoid increasing $r(V)$

- In every 'assure' and 'avoid', there is a **GOTO**-statement

	S_P	S_Q	$S_{P^{-1}}$	$S_{Q^{-1}}$
$\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$	assure $\text{chop}(P(v) \oplus v) = RO(M)$	—	—	—
$r(V)$	assure min. increase	assure min. increase	—	—

Proof (idea)



- R_1 is a relay algorithm
- S_1 is S with **GOTO**-statements removed

$$\text{Adv}(\mathcal{D}) = O(\Pr(\mathbf{GOTO} \text{ is executed})) = O\left(\frac{(Kq)^4}{2^l}\right)$$

(\mathcal{D} makes at most q queries of length at most K message blocks)

Our Result

$$\text{Adv}(\mathcal{D}) = O\left(\frac{(Kq)^4}{2^l}\right)$$

(\mathcal{D} makes at most q queries of length at most K message blocks)

- Grøstl behaves like a random oracle up to $2^{n/2}$ queries (recall $l \geq 2n$)

Our Result

$$\text{Adv}(\mathcal{D}) = O\left(\frac{(Kq)^4}{2^l}\right)$$

(\mathcal{D} makes at most q queries of length at most K message blocks)

- Grøstl behaves like a random oracle up to $2^{n/2}$ queries (recall $l \geq 2n$)
- Other second round SHA-3 candidates, like JH, Keccak and Shabal, have recently also been proven indifferentiable

	bound for $n = 256$
Grøstl	$O(q^4/2^{512})$
JH	$O(q^3/2^{512})$
Keccak	$O(q^2/2^{512})$
Shabal	$O(q^2/2^{896})$

Our Result

$$\text{Adv}(\mathcal{D}) = O\left(\frac{(Kq)^4}{2^l}\right)$$

(\mathcal{D} makes at most q queries of length at most K message blocks)

- Grøstl behaves like a random oracle up to $2^{n/2}$ queries (recall $l \geq 2n$)
- Other second round SHA-3 candidates, like JH, Keccak and Shabal, have recently also been proven indifferentiable

	bound for $n = 256$	state size
Grøstl	$O(q^4/2^{512})$	$l = 512$
JH	$O(q^3/2^{512})$	$l = 1024$
Keccak	$O(q^2/2^{512})$	$l = 1600$
Shabal	$O(q^2/2^{896})$	$l = 1408$

Our Result

$$\text{Adv}(\mathcal{D}) = O\left(\frac{(Kq)^4}{2^l}\right)$$

(\mathcal{D} makes at most q queries of length at most K message blocks)

- Grøstl behaves like a random oracle up to $2^{n/2}$ queries (recall $l \geq 2n$)
- Other second round SHA-3 candidates, like JH, Keccak and Shabal, have recently also been proven indifferentiable

	bound for $n = 256$	state size
Grøstl	$O(q^4/2^{512})$	$l = 512$
JH	$O(q^3/2^{512})$	$l = 1024$
Keccak	$O(q^2/2^{512})$	$l = 1600$
Shabal	$O(q^2/2^{896})$	$l = 1408$

- Would Grøstl have state size 1024, we would have $O(q^4/2^{1024})$

Outline

- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 Differentiability of Grøstail
- 3 Indifferentiability of Grøstl
- 4 Conclusions


Conclusions

- We proved the **indifferentiability of Grøstl**, under the assumption that P, Q are two independent random permutations
- Grøstl behaves like a random oracle up to $2^{n/2}$ queries
- Existing results could not be carried over to Grøstl:
 - Compression function and final transformation are differentiable
 - We additionally demonstrated that **Grøstail is differentiable**
- Open problem: improving the bound

Thank you for your attention!


SUPPORTING SLIDES!!!

Design of the Simulator




- Black = old edges, Red = newly added edges in a certain query
- When adding edges to tree, make sure that:
 - 1 End node of edge has no outgoing edge in the updated graph

Design of the Simulator




- Black = old edges, Red = newly added edges in a certain query
- When adding edges to tree, make sure that:
 - 1 End node of edge has no outgoing edge in the updated graph
 - 2 End node of edge has no incoming edge in the updated graph (except for the edge itself, of course)

Design of the Simulator



- Black = old edges, Red = newly added edges in a certain query
- When adding edges to tree, make sure that:
 - 1 End node of edge has no outgoing edge in the updated graph
 - 2 End node of edge has no incoming edge in the updated graph (except for the edge itself, of course)
 - 3 $\bar{r}(V)$ is *never* increased with a node in the updated $\text{dom}(P)$

Design of the Simulator



- Black = old edges, Red = newly added edges in a certain query
- When adding edges to tree, make sure that:
 - 1 End node of edge has no outgoing edge in the updated graph
 - 2 End node of edge has no incoming edge in the updated graph (except for the edge itself, of course)
 - 3 $\bar{r}(V)$ is *never* increased with a node in the updated $\text{dom}(P)$
- In general: $r(V)$ and $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$ should be increased as little as possible

Design of the Simulator

- In inverse queries, the simulator can always avoid increasing $r(V)$ and $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$

Design of the Simulator

- In inverse queries, the simulator can always avoid increasing $r(V)$ and $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$
- In forward queries, the simulator may be *forced* to increase $r(V)$ or $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$
 - Simulator is forced to increase $r(V)$
 - Make sure that 1.-3. (of previous slide) are satisfied

Design of the Simulator

- In inverse queries, the simulator can always avoid increasing $r(V)$ and $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$
- In forward queries, the simulator may be *forced* to increase $r(V)$ or $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$
 - Simulator is forced to increase $r(V)$
 - Make sure that 1.-3. (of previous slide) are satisfied
 - Simulator is forced to increase $\bar{r}(V) \cap \text{dom}(P)$
 - **This only happens if** \mathcal{D} queries $P(v)$ for $v \in \bar{r}(V)$
 - Simulator uses RO to output $P(v)$ such that $\text{chop}_{l-n}(P(v) \oplus v) = RO(M)$
- Notice that $\bar{r}(V)$ only increases if $r(V)$ increases

Proof (idea)

$$\Pr(\mathcal{D}^{RO, S^{RO}} = 1) = \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_1} = 1)$$

$$\Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_1} = 1) = \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_2} = 1)$$

$$\left| \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_2} = 1) - \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_3} = 1) \right| \leq \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_2} \text{ sets bad}) + \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_3} \text{ sets bad})$$

$$\Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_3} = 1) = \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_4} = 1)$$

$$\left| \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_4} = 1) - \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_5} = 1) \right| \leq \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_4} \text{ sets bad})$$

$$\left| \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_5} = 1) - \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_6} = 1) \right| \leq \frac{r_P^2}{2^l}$$

$$\Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_6} = 1) = \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{Gr^{P,Q}, (P,Q)} = 1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{Gr^{P,Q}, (P,Q)} = 1) - \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{RO, S^{RO}} = 1) \right| &\leq 3\Pr(\mathcal{D}^{G_4} \text{ sets bad}) + \frac{r_P^2}{2^l} \\ &= O\left(\frac{(Kq)^4}{2^l}\right) \end{aligned}$$