

Radboud University



# Algebraic and Higher-Order Differential Cryptanalysis of Pyjamask-96

---

C. Dobraunig, Y. Rotella, J. Schoone

FSE 2020



Pyjamask is a 2<sup>nd</sup>-round candidate for the NIST lightweight competition

By Goudarzi, Jean, Kölbl, Peyrin, Rivain, Sasaki and Sim.

- Pyjamask-128-AEAD
  - based on Pyjamask-128
  - uses OCB as mode
- Pyjamask-96-AEAD
  - based on Pyjamask-96
  - uses OCB as mode

We focused on the block cipher Pyjamask-96.

Key recovery attack on full-round Pyjamask-96

Pyjamask-96 state ( $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$ ):

$x_0$	$x_1$	$x_2$	$x_3$	$x_4$	$x_5$	$x_6$	$x_7$	$x_8$	$x_9$	$x_{10}$	$x_{11}$	$x_{12}$	$x_{13}$	$x_{14}$	$x_{15}$	$x_{16}$	$x_{17}$	$x_{18}$	$x_{19}$	$x_{20}$	$x_{21}$	$x_{22}$	$x_{23}$	$x_{24}$	$x_{25}$	$x_{26}$	$x_{27}$	$x_{28}$	$x_{29}$	$x_{30}$	$x_{31}$
$x_{32}$	$x_{33}$	$x_{34}$	$x_{35}$	$x_{36}$	$x_{37}$	$x_{38}$	$x_{39}$	$x_{40}$	$x_{41}$	$x_{42}$	$x_{43}$	$x_{44}$	$x_{45}$	$x_{46}$	$x_{47}$	$x_{48}$	$x_{49}$	$x_{50}$	$x_{51}$	$x_{52}$	$x_{53}$	$x_{54}$	$x_{55}$	$x_{56}$	$x_{57}$	$x_{58}$	$x_{59}$	$x_{60}$	$x_{61}$	$x_{62}$	$x_{63}$
$x_{64}$	$x_{65}$	$x_{66}$	$x_{67}$	$x_{68}$	$x_{69}$	$x_{70}$	$x_{71}$	$x_{72}$	$x_{73}$	$x_{74}$	$x_{75}$	$x_{76}$	$x_{77}$	$x_{78}$	$x_{79}$	$x_{80}$	$x_{81}$	$x_{82}$	$x_{83}$	$x_{84}$	$x_{85}$	$x_{86}$	$x_{87}$	$x_{88}$	$x_{89}$	$x_{90}$	$x_{91}$	$x_{92}$	$x_{93}$	$x_{94}$	$x_{95}$

- AddRoundKey: linear key schedule applied to key of 128 bits
- SubBytes: a 3-bit S-box of degree 2
- MixRows: circulant binary matrix to rows

Pyjamask-96 consists of 14 rounds.

## Definition (Derivative [Lai, 1994])

Let  $F: \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$  and  $a \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$  be given.

Then the derivative of  $F$  to  $a$ ,  $\Delta_a F$  is:  $\Delta_a F(x) = F(x + a) + F(x)$ .

Properties:

- $\Delta_{a_k} \Delta_{a_{k-1}} \cdots \Delta_{a_1} F(x) = \sum_{v \in [a_1, \dots, a_k]} F(x + v) =: \Delta_V F(x)$
- $\deg \Delta_V F(x) \leq \deg F - \dim V$
- If  $\dim V > \deg F$ , then we have  $\Delta_V F(x) = 0$

Degrees of the  $n$ -round versions of Pyjamask-96 are upper bounded by

$n$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11+
degree	2	4	8	16	32	64	80	88	92	94	95


Bounds by Boura, Canteaut, De Cannière [2011]

Affine spaces  $V$  of dimension 94 give distinguisher

$$\sum_{v \in V} \text{Pyj}_K^{10}(x + v) = C^{\text{st}}$$

Same for the inverse of Pyjamask-96!

# Meet-in-the-middle



- Smartly choosing affine ciphertext space gives 11 rounds instead
- $\mathcal{U} = \{u \in \mathbb{F}_2^{96} \mid u_0 = u_{32} = u_{64} = 0\}$  has codimension 3
- $V_0 = \{0, v\}$  where  $v_i = 0$  for all  $i \in \{1, \dots, 31, 33, \dots, 63, \dots, 95\}$
- $\mathcal{V} = \mathcal{U} \oplus V_0$  has dimension 94 and
- $\sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \text{Pyj}_K^{11}(x + v)$  constant

# Solving equations

- Taking key-bits as variables gives system of equations
- Linearise to solve linear system of monomials
  - Full codebook gives 448 equations
  - Too many monomials

- Reducing in S-box:

$$\begin{aligned} S(P + K)_0 &= (p_0 + k_0)(p_2 + k_2) + p_1 + k_1 \\ &= S(P)_0 + S(K)_0 + p_0k_2 + p_2k_0 \end{aligned}$$

- Applying further MixRows and AddRoundKey:

$$(L \circ S)(P) + (L \circ S)(K_0) + K_1 + \sum_{\substack{i,j \in I \\ |I|=11,13}} p_i k_j + p_j k_i$$

- Equivalent key:  $\kappa = (L \circ S)(K_0) + K_1$ ,
- Equivalent plaintext:  $P' = (L \circ S)(P)$
- Still too many monomials



- Guess-and-determine on roundkey bits
  - Guess all bits in first roundkey:
  - 96 guesses  $\rightarrow$  569 monomials
  - Guess four more bits in the second roundkey:
  - 100 guesses  $\rightarrow$  411 monomials
- Introduces a  $2^{100}$  factor in computation

Rounds	Time (in Pyjamask-96 calls)	Data (in blocks)
14/14	$2^{115}$	$2^{96}$
13/14	$2^{99}$	$2^{96}$
12/14	$2^{96}$	$2^{96}$
11/14	$2^{91}$	$2^{95}$
10/14	$2^{83}$	$2^{87}$
9/14	$2^{67}$	$2^{71}$
8/14	$2^{35}$	$2^{39}$
7/14	$2^{27}$	$2^{23}$

- Attacking Pyjamask-96-AEAD
  - We got to 7 rounds with  $2^{86}$  time complexity,  $2^{41}$  data.
- Attacking Pyjamask-128-AEAD